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This paper analyzes long run outcomes resulting from adopting a binding minimum 
wage. The model distinguishes between workers of heterogeneous ability, and capitalists 
who do all the saving, and it entails – relative to the perfectly competitive benchmark - 
large output and employment losses (among the lowest-ability workers) from the 
imposition of moderately binding minimum wages. These effects arise not only because 
firms respond to the wage increase – relative to the static perfectly competitive 
benchmark – by moving upwards along a given labour demand curve, but also due to 
inward shifts of the labour demand curve as savers respond to decreases in the (net of 
taxes) rate of return on their savings by saving less, thus reducing the economy’s steady-
state capital stock. Nevertheless, and despite the large, long-run, declines in aggregate 
output, consumption, and the capital stock implied by this model, MW legislation can be 
beneficial for large segments of employed workers, as long as they do not have to 
provide generous welfare support to the low-ability workers that the MW prevents them 
from finding employment. 
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1    Introduction 
Minimum wage legislation is one of the oldest government interventions in the labour market. 
However, throughout its history it has met with opposition by (many) economists. For 
example, Webb (1912) with reference to the imposition of a minimum wage in the Australian 
province of Victoria in 1896, mentions that it was opposed with familiar arguments, i.e. that 
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‘it was "against the laws of Political Economy", that it would cause the most hardly pressed 
businesses to shut down, that it would restrict employment, that it would drive away Capital, 
that it would be cruel to the aged worker and the poor widow, that it could not be carried out 
in practice, and so on and so forth’ (p. 973). 1 Yet, Webb concluded, that in a few years the 
minimum wage institution was receiving such widespread support that ‘… no statesman, no 
economist, no political party nor any responsible newspaper of Victoria, however much a 
critic of details, ever dreams now of undoing the Minimum Wage Law itself’ (p. 976).    
Despite economists’ warnings, the popularity of the minimum wage institution continues 
unabated a century later. In a recent (January 2014) Pew Research Center poll, 73% of 
Americans supported a rise in the minimum wage to $10.10 (per hour) from the current $7.25 
rate. Moreover, in a December 2013 Wall Street Journal poll, 63% were in support of an 
increase to $10.10, whereas 43% said they backed an increase to $12.50 an hour, and 28% 
backed a $15 wage. These figures reveal that if the question involved smaller increases in the 
minimum wage (e.g. to $9.00) the support would be overwhelming.2 In Germany, one of the 
few countries which only recently (January 2015) introduced, for the first time, a (national) 
minimum wage, a survey of German managers, conducted for the Handelsblatt business 
newspaper in July 2013, showed that 57% wanted a mandatory minimum wage in the 
country. An hourly rate of €8.88 was considered suitable, which is higher than the €8.50 rate 
which came into force in January 2015.  
During the last two decades the opposition of economists to the minimum wage institution 
has become less vociferous – possibly due to the large number of theoretical and empirical 
studies which have questioned the standard prediction of competitive models (and earlier 
empirical consensus3)  that binding minimum wages result in employment losses. The first 
dent in the consensus came with Card and Krueger’s (1994) study of the impact on fast-food 
employment of the 1992 increase in the New Jersey state minimum wage. Their finding of 
                                                 
1 Webb mentions that the minimum wage initially applied to ‘five specially "sweated" trades’, and that 
by 1910 it had expanded its coverage to practically every trade. Moreover, he mentions that in many 
cases it came about with the willing acquiescence of the employers, who, as they told him, 
appreciated the fact that ‘the Minimum Wage is fixed by law and therefore really forced on all 
employers: the security that the Act accordingly gives them against being undercut by the dishonest 
or disloyal competitors, who simply will not (in Victoria as in the Port of London) adhere to the 
Common Rules agreed upon by Collective Bargaining’ (pp. 975-976).  
2 The poll also showed that support for the $10.10 rate was broad, including 61% of those earning 
$75,000 (per annum) or more and 68% of those earning $30,000 or less.   
3 The consensus was captured by Brown et al. (1982, p. 524), who, on the basis of a six-volume report 
summarizing evidence for the United States and Canada, concluded that: for teenagers (ages 16-19), a 
10 percent increase in the minimum wage reduced teen employment, most plausibly, between 1 and 3 
percent; for young adults (ages 20-24), the employment impact is “negative and smaller than that for 
teenagers”; for adults, the “direction of the effect...is uncertain in the empirical work as it is in the 
theory.” 
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"no evidence that the rise in New Jersey's minimum wage reduced employment at fast-food 
restaurants in the state (p. 796), caused a stir among economists and released a flurry of 
theoretical and empirical research (see e.g. Card and Krueger, 1995 and 2000; Machin and 
Manning, 1997; Neumark and Wascher, 2000 and 2008; Manning, 2003; Dickens and 
Manning, 2004; Dube et al., 2010; Allegretto et al., 2011; Neumark et al., 2014) which, to say 
the least, has not managed to re-establish the previous consensus.  
The purpose of the present paper is not to join the debate about the likely employment 
effects of minimum wages.4 Its purpose is to examine, in a model with competitive features, 
whether minimum wages can be beneficial for workers in the long run, i.e. once we allow for 
the potential effects of minimum wages on capital accumulation. In competitive models with 
homogeneous labour and without capital accumulation (i.e. in a static framework), if, say a 
policymaker, wished to maximize aggregate workers’ income (i.e. the wage bill), it would set 
the minimum wage at a level such that the wage elasticity of the labour demand curve is one. 
If at that wage level labour supply exceeded labour demand and some workers became 
unemployed, the trade union could, in principle, redistribute the maximized wage bill among 
all (employed and unemployed) workers and guarantee a higher income to all of them relative 
to the competitive case.5 However, in a dynamic framework, in which saving in the form of 
physical capital is allowed, the decrease in compensation to other factor owners (e.g. 
capitalists) which the imposition of a (binding) minimum wage generates, could reduce 
capital accumulation. This in turn could result in an inward shift of the labour demand curve, 
and therefore to a fall in aggregate labour income. This is the issue we investigate in this 
paper. Surprisingly, this issue has not been investigated before (to our knowledge), possibly 
because the emphasis of the debate was on whether the “textbook” (static) competitive model 
was a reasonable approximation of actual labour markets, and whether binding minimum 
wages could be implemented without employment losses in models with a fixed capital 
stock.6  
We deliberately adopt a bare bones perfectly competitive framework in our analysis. This 
is done not because we believe that the perfectly competitive framework would be the 
                                                 
4 It bears noting that the debate about the employment effects of minimum wage increases does not 
imply disagreement among economists that significant disemployment effects will arise if minimum 
wages surpass some threshold; the disagreement was, and is, whether at its current level (or, its 
proposed level) the minimum wage is below or above that threshold (see, e.g. Card and Krueger, 
1995).  
5 If the comparison was made in utility terms, the increase in utility would be even higher since, in 
principle, some (or, all of the workers in the case of work-sharing) would be able to enjoy more 
leisure.     
6 Another strand of the literature on minimum wages has investigated whether minimum wages are an 
efficient redistributive tool and whether other more efficient methods of supporting persons with low-
earning ability can be devised (see, e.g. Allen, 1987).    
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“natural” outcome in the absence of minimum wages – after all, political institutions, 
government policies and regulations have a discernible impact on the so-called “market” 
outcomes. (Thus, outcomes that appear like ‘natural’ market allocations may in fact be the 
result of political decisions, or indeed of deliberate policy inaction.) It is also done not 
because we wish to ignore the various arguments that have been put forward in order to 
explain the possibly benign influence of minimum wages on employment, growth, or 
welfare. 7  We do it because we wish to use a first-best benchmark and to ensure the 
disemployment effects of minimum wages, since in the opposite case the increase in 
aggregate labour income would be, trivially, guaranteed.  
Our only point of departure from the conventional labour market model is in assuming that 
workers are heterogeneous in ability. Starting with Mirlees (1971), this is a standard feature 
of the optimal taxation literature in public finance.8 However, our paper departs from this 
literature in two ways. First, we introduce capital accumulation (see, e.g. Judd, 1985; 
Chamley, 1986; Acemoglu, 2009) and second, we distinguish between workers, who work 
but do not save, and capitalists who save but do not work. This is important since we allow 
the wage rate per unit of ability to be endogenously determined in the labour market. More 
specifically, we assume that workers differ in their endowment of effective labour supply 
(i.e., ability), which is in turn reflected in differences in labour income across workers. 
Minimum wages - which are set per unit of time rather than per effective unit of labour - 
induce redistribution from the low- ability workers that cannot find a job due to the wage 
floor,9 to the rest of the workers. This is because minimum wages drive the low ability 
workers out of employment, thus raising the marginal product and the wages (per effective 
unit of labour) of employed workers. As a consequence, and to the extent that minimum 
wages impact on capital accumulation, we are able to take into account an additional effect of 
minimum wages, which works through shifting inwardly the traditional static labour demand 
curve. 
                                                 
7 It has long been recognized (e.g. Robinson, 1933) that for the imposition of minimum wages to have 
beneficial effects on workers’ welfare, firms must face imperfectly elastic labour supply curves; this  
could arise either due to monopsony power or due to the presence of efficiency wage considerations – 
in which case “labour supply” would refer to effective units of labour (see, e.g. Rebitzer and Taylor, 
1995; Manning,1995; Manning, 2003).  
8 For applications of these type of models to the minimum wage debate, from an optimal taxation 
perspective, see Allen (1987), Guesnerie and Roberts (1987), Marceau and Boadway (1994), and 
Boadway and Cuff (2001). The latter paper shows that a minimum wage policy combined with 
forcing non-working welfare recipients to look for jobs (and accept job offers) can increase the 
amount of redistribution from those working to those not working, and possibly reduce 
unemployment. 
9 For political economy models which emphasize this feature in a static framework, see, e.g. Saint-Paul 
(2000), and Adam and Moutos (2011). 
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Throughout the paper we adopt a CES specification for technology, which allows changes 
in factor prices to affect factor shares but necessitates the use of numerical solutions.10  We 
develop the model and derive the results in stages. In Section 2, we assume a comprehensive 
linear tax on all sources of income with the exception of welfare benefits for the unemployed. 
Using a wide variety of plausible parameter values, in Section 3 we show that it is possible, 
under decreasing returns to scale and linear taxation, for the after-tax incomes of all employed 
workers to increase under a minimum-wage regime11 but only if the unemployed receive 
welfare payments significantly smaller than what their incomes would be in the competitive 
case. In other words, it is impossible for the minimum-wage regime to increase the after-tax 
aggregate income of (employed cum unemployed) workers. Moreover, (all) employed 
workers can become better-off through the imposition of a minimum wage only by making 
the low-ability workers worse-off (in terms of after-tax income).12 The effects of minimum-
wage legislation thus match with what Stigler (1970) termed Director’s Law – according to 
which public interventions are made for the primary benefit of the middle classes, and 
financed with taxes which are borne in considerable part by the (rich) capitalists and the 
poor.13  
Since most actual tax systems do not resemble the linear tax system, we proceed in 
Section 4 to consider the effects of minimum wages under a variety of simple non-linear tax 
structures. The first variant involves a single tax rate on all sources of income, but, for labour 
income alone, any income below a threshold level goes untaxed. The resulting tax 
progressivity on labour income implies that not all employed workers benefit from the 
imposition of a minimum wage; workers of medium ability that remain employed and do not 
face high average tax rates can benefit even if the welfare support provided to the 
                                                 
10  Adopting a Cobb-Douglas specification would not obviate the need for numerical simulations, 
although some analytical results could be established in this case for the case of linear taxation; for 
more details, see Economides and Moutos (2016). 
11 We consider both moderate and substantial increases in minimum wages relative to the perfectly 
competitive benchmark. We find that the political viability of the minimum wage regime decreases as 
it increases in size.   
12 Even though the unemployed are left with a lower income than in the absence of the minimum wage, 
it is possible that their utility is higher with the minimum wage – since they enjoy more leisure. In a 
model with two skill levels (low- and high-skill), and under the assumption of efficient job rationing 
(i.e. the incidence of unemployment is among the low-skill workers with the highest disutility of 
work), Lee and Saez (2012) demonstrate that a minimum wage is desirable if the government values 
redistribution toward low wage workers. Although we do not focus on welfare outcomes in the 
present paper, it would be an interesting exercise to embed the Lee and Saez framework in a model 
with capital accumulation and study whether their results survive in a non-static framework.     
13 The (after-tax) income of capitalists declines since, first, their profits and capital holdings decrease, 
and, second, they have to contribute part of the tax revenue needed to finance the welfare transfers to 
the unemployed.    
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unemployed (and the taxes required to finance it) is not meager. However, tax progressivity 
implies that workers at the high end of the ability distribution will see their (after-tax) 
incomes reduced if a minimum wage is implemented. If citizens express their policy 
preferences on the basis of their incomes alone, then a coalition against minimum wages can 
develop which involves low-ability workers (who shall become unemployed), high-ability 
workers (who shall face significantly higher tax rates), and the capitalists. Nevertheless, we 
show that for levels of welfare support at which no majority could be formed under linear 
taxation, this can be achieved under progressive taxation.  
Other variants of progressive taxation discussed in Section 4 involve non-taxation of 
capital income (so as not to reduce the incentives for capital accumulation), along with 
different ways of apportioning the tax burden between labour income and profits. We find 
that excluding capital income from taxation does not increase the proportion of citizens in 
favour of the minimum wage. This is because, as in the previous cases, the capitalists and the 
unemployed remain against the minimum wage; but now the high-ability workers would have 
to shoulder a higher tax burden since capital income goes untaxed, thus reducing the threshold 
of ability above which (high-ability) workers would lose from the minimum wage. The 
importance of this effect appears to outweigh the beneficial effect on wage rates that higher 
capital accumulation could provide, thus reducing the political support for minimum wages.   
In Section 5 we discuss further some politico-economic considerations which can increase 
the attractiveness of minimum wages to organized labour interests (or, to workers in general) 
despite the possible decrease in the aggregate level of income accruing to workers. The final 
section offers concluding comments and discusses some caveats of our analysis.    
2    The Basic Model 
We consider a closed economy producing a single good under perfectly competitive 
conditions.14 Capital and labour are the only factors used in the production of the good. We 
distinguish between workers and capitalists in two ways. First, capitalists save, whereas 
workers consume all their income in each period.15 Second, we assume that capitalists are a 
                                                 
14 We do not analyse the case of imperfectly competitive product markets -which, in general, produces 
employment responses in response to the imposition of a binding minimum wage which are similar to 
the competitive case, since, it would require the use of a parameter value for the elasticity of the 
(aggregate) product demand curve for which no information exists. 
15 We note also that the presence of two distinct groups of agents is important in our framework since if 
the population consisted of just (heterogeneous) workers, then workers would no longer be able to 
extract a larger share of output without hurting themselves. This is because a rise in the wage rate 
earned by workers reduces the profits of the firms and the dividends received by the workers who are 
the sole owners of the firms. In this framework the inefficiency introduced by the minimum wage 
hurts the workers as there is no other group (i.e. the capitalists) on which the cost of inefficiency can 
be transferred to and from which workers can extract a larger share of output. Economides and 
Moutos (2016) provide an analysis of this issue in a Ramsey-type framework.   
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homogeneous group, but workers differ in ability.16 Since the latter feature is an important 
building block of our analysis, we start by describing this aspect of our model.   
2.1 The Perfectly Competitive Case 
2.1.1 Workers  
There is a fixed number of workers in the economy, which we normalize to 1. For all worker-
based households (workers, thereafter) are assumed to have identical preferences (described 
below). However, workers differ in ability, as reflected in their endowment of effective 
number of labour units per unit of time (e.g. per hour, or day, or year). We assume that all 
workers have the same endowment of time units at their disposal (which we also normalize to 
1), and that they supply inelastically their endowment of effective labour units. 17  The 
distribution of effective labour units (ability) among workers is described by the Pareto 
distribution. Letting e denote the ability of a worker, the Pareto distribution is defined over 
the interval , and its CDF is  
𝐹(𝑒) = 1 − (𝑏 𝑒⁄ )ఈ,   𝛼 > 1, 𝑏 > 0                                    (1)  
Parameter 𝑏  stands for the lowest ability in the population of workers, and parameter  
determines the shape of the distribution (higher values of  𝑎 imply greater equality in the 
distribution of ability). The Pareto distribution, in addition to being easy to work with, is a 
relatively good approximation of actual income distributions (see, e.g. Creedy, 1997; Gabaix, 
2016). The mean of the Pareto distribution is equal to,  
 𝜇 = 𝛼𝛽/(𝛼 − 1)                        (2) 
and the median ability of workers is 
𝑚 = 2ଵ ఈൗ 𝑏                           (3) 
Workers (denoted by the superscript L) are assumed to have intertemporally additive 
preferences of the form,  
                                                 
16 Allowing capitalists to be a heterogeneous group may be an interesting extension of our model, but 
we do not pursue it here since it would not affect the qualitative nature of our results.   
17 Introducing the possibility of endogenous labour supply would be an interesting extension of the 
model. However, as shown in a different context by Economides and Moutos (2016), the existence of 
a variable labour supply is not crucial for determining the sign of the impact of the minimum wage on 
the after-tax wage rate.      
e b≥
a
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𝑈௜௅ = ∑  𝛽௧𝑙𝑛(𝐶௧,௜௅ ) ஶ௧ୀ଴         (4)     
where 0<β<1 is the discount factor, and 𝐶௧,௜௅   stands for worker’s i consumption at time t. 
Workers’ incomes are equal to their labour earnings, which are equal to worker’s ability times 
the wage per effective unit of labour, 𝑒௜𝑤௧. We assume that workers consume in each period 
all of their current earnings. This assumption is not essential for our results and it can be 
motivated as an endogenous response of workers due to the presence of prohibitively large 
costs for their participation in the capital market; in contrast, these costs are lower for 
capitalists. The above imply that the consumption of workers evolves according to: 
 𝐶௧,௜௅ = 𝑒௜𝑤௧                      (5)         
2.1.2 Capitalists 
There is a fixed number, 𝑁, of identical capitalists in the economy.18 In contrast to workers, 
they do not directly participate in production, but supply the capital used by firms and receive 
as dividends the firms’ profits.19 For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we assume 
that the number of capitalists is equal to the number of firms. Their preferences20 are similar 
to workers’, i.e.  
𝑈௄ = ∑ 𝛽௧𝑙𝑛(𝐶௧௄) ஶ௧ୀ଴       (6) 
whereas their budget constraints are, 
𝐶௧௄ + 𝐾௧ାଵ௄ − (1 − 𝛿)𝛫௧௄ = Π௧ + 𝑟௧𝐾௧௄     (7) 
In equation (6),  𝐶௧௄  stands for the consumption of each capitalist, and in equation (7), 
𝛫௧௄, 𝑟௧𝐾௧௄, and Π௧ stand for the capital stock, capital income, and profits accruing to each 
capitalist. Each capitalist is assumed to solve the following programme: 
max
஼೟಼ ,௄೟శభ಼  
ℒ = ෍ 𝛽௧ሼ𝑙𝑛𝐶௧௄ + 𝜆௧(Π௧ + 𝑟௧𝐾௧௄ − 𝐶௧௄ − 𝐾௧ାଵ௄ + (1 − 𝛿)𝛫௧௄)ሽ
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
 
                                                 
18 The share of capitalists in the population is thus equal to 𝑁/(𝑁 + 1). 
19 Following standard practice, and consistent with perfectly competitive behavior, we assume that each 
capitalist does not have a general equilibrium awareness of his actions when choosing how much 
capital to accumulate, i.e. he disregards any potential impact that his actions may have on the return 
to capital and on firms’ profits.  
20 For convenience we drop the subscript pertaining to each capitalist since they are identical. 
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The resulting first-order conditions are:  
𝜆௧ = 1/𝐶௧௄       (8a) 
𝜆௧ = 𝛽𝜆௧ାଵ(𝑟௧ାଵ + 1 − 𝛿)    (8b) 
Combining equations (8a) and (8b) we get: 
𝐶௧ାଵ௄ = 𝛽(𝑟௧ାଵ + 1 − 𝛿)𝐶௧௄        (9) 
Equation (9) summarizes the optimal consumption path for the capitalists, and (implicitly), 
along with their budget constraint, the supply of capital in the economy.  
2.1.3 Firms 
In this section we assume that firms’ technology of converting inputs into output is 
represented by a generalized constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function21 
𝑌௧ = [𝜃൫𝐾௧௙൯
ఘ + (1 − 𝜃)൫𝐿௧௙൯
ద]జ ద⁄      (10) 
where 𝑌௧ denotes output, 𝐾௧௙ is the capital stock used by the firm, 𝐿௧௙ is the number of effective 
units of labour used by the firm, 𝜌 ≤ 1 is a parameter governing the size of the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and capital, 𝜎 , with 𝜎 ≡ 1 (1 − 𝜌)⁄ , and 𝜐 < 1  implies 
decreasing returns to scale. Parameter 𝜃 ∈ (0, 1)  is a distribution parameter, which 
determines how important the labour and capital inputs are in the production process. We note 
that if 𝜐 = 1, and 𝜌 goes to zero, the production function converges to a constant-returns-to 
scale Cobb-Douglas one.  
Firms maximize profits by choosing the appropriate use of capital and labour services, i.e. 
each firm,   
max௅೟೑,௄೟೑ Π௧ = 𝑌௧ − 𝑤௧𝐿௧
௙ − 𝑟௧𝐾௧௙     
subject to the constraint imposed by equation (10). The first order conditions for factor use 
are:  
                                                 
21 The qualitative nature of our results does not largely depend on the chosen algebraic form of the 
production function, since, as discussed earlier (footnote 15) and in Section 3, the driving force 
behind our results is the presence of worker heterogeneity and the existence of another class of agents 
(capitalists) to which, along with the unemployed, the efficiency costs of minimum wages can be 
offloaded.  
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𝑤௧ = 𝜐(1 − 𝜃)൫𝐿௧௙൯
ఘିଵ ቂ𝜃൫𝐾௧௙൯
ఘ + (1 − 𝜃)൫𝐿௧௙൯
దቃ(జିద) ద
⁄
   (11) 
𝑟௧ = 𝜐𝜃൫𝐾௧௙൯
ఘିଵ[𝜃൫𝐾௧௙൯
ఘ + (1 − 𝜃)൫𝐿௧௙൯
ద](జିద) ద⁄       (12) 
These imply that the profits accruing to each entrepreneur are:  
Π௧ = (1 − 𝜐)𝑌௧      (13) 
2.1.4 Factor Market Equilibrium  
The aggregate supply of effective units of labour of all workers is found by the associated 
PDF of the Pareto distribution to be, 
𝐿௦ = ׬ 𝑒 ቄ𝛼 ௕ഀ௘ഀశభቅ 𝑑𝑒 =
ఈ௕
ఈିଵ
ஶ
௕           (14) 
i.e., it is just equal to the mean units of effective labour times the number of workers (which 
we have normalized to 1). Labour market equilibrium obtains when the aggregate demand for 
labour by the 𝑁௄ firms is equal to aggregate labour supply, i.e. when,  
 𝑁௄𝐿௧௙ = ఈ௕ఈିଵ      (15) 
Similarly, equilibrium in the capital market obtains when the total supply of capital – as 
provided by the capitalists – is equal to the demand for capital by firms, i.e. when  
𝛫௧௄ = 𝛫௧௙     (16)       
2.1.5 General Equilibrium 
The dynamic behavior of the model is described by equations (5), (7), (9), (10), (11), (12), 
(13), (15), and (16), which, in long-run equilibrium, collapse to the following system (for ease 
of exposition we drop the time subscripts, and the superscripts distinguishing between 
capitalists and firms, since each firm is owned by a single capitalist, e.g. 𝐿௧௙ = 𝐿 ):  
𝐶௜௅ = 𝑒௜𝑤         (LR1) 
1 = 𝛽(𝑟 + 1 − 𝛿)     (LR2) 
𝐶௄ + 𝛿𝐾 = Π + 𝑟𝐾      (LR3) 
𝑌 = [𝜃(𝐾)ఘ + (1 − 𝜃)(𝐿)ద]జ ద⁄             (LR4) 
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Π = (1 − 𝜐)𝑌       (LR5) 
𝑁௄𝐿 = ఈ௕ఈିଵ         (LR6) 
𝑤 = 𝜐(1 − 𝜃)(𝐿)ఘିଵ[𝜃(𝐾)ఘ + (1 − 𝜃)(𝐿)ద](జିద) ద⁄         (LR7) 
𝑟 = 𝜐𝜃(𝐾)ఘିଵ[𝜃(𝐾)ఘ + (1 − 𝜃)(𝐿)ద](జିద) ద⁄     (LR8) 
Equations (LR2) -(LR8) determine the long-run equilibrium values of w, r, K, L, Y, Π, 
and 𝐶௄.  We note that once the value of the wage rate is found we can determine the entire 
distribution of  workers’ consumption through equation (LR1).   
More formally note that the right-hand-side (RHS) of Equation (LR2) is monotonic in r, 
and thus this equation determines a unique value of r. Similarly, Equation (LR6) uniquely 
determines L. We note that the RHS of Equation (LR8) is monotonic in K for plausible 
parameter values22; thus, using the values for r and L previously determined, we can uniquely 
solve for K. Using the solutions for L and K into Equations (LR4) and (LR7)—which are also 
monotonic in their arguments—we can solve for the unique values of Y and w, respectively. 
Given the solutions for Y, K and r, equations (LR5) and (LR3) can each uniquely solve for Π, 
and 𝐶௄  , respectively. Finally, note that once the value of the wage rate is found we can 
uniquely solve for the entire distribution of workers’ consumption through equation (LR1).  
2.2 Minimum Wages 
We now assume the existence of a government-imposed minimum wage per unit of labour 
time (e.g. per hour) equal to 𝑦, which is the minimum amount that an employer must pay in 
order to employ one person. This minimum wage per unit of time must be distinguished from 
the wage rate per effective unit of labour, which will be market-determined (i.e. as in the 
previous section). 
2.2.1 Labour Market 
The minimum wage constraint implies that firms will not be willing to employ workers whose 
level of ability (i.e. number of efficient units of labour per unit of time) is such that:  
𝑦 > 𝑒௜𝜛௧      
where 𝜛௧  stands for the market-determined wage rate per effective unit of labour in the 
                                                 
22 See our discussion in Section 3.1.  
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presence of the minimum-wage (per unit of time) constraint at time t.23 To avoid confusion in 
what follows we shall refer to the exogenously set, 𝑦, simply as the minimum wage, in order 
to differentiate it from the minimum wage rate, 𝜛௧, and the competitive wage rate, 𝑤, both of 
which are endogenously determined. Let 𝜀௧ denote the level of ability for which it holds that: 
𝑦 = 𝜀௧𝜛௧       (17) 
It follows that only workers with 𝑒௜ ≥ 𝜀௧ will be employed by firms, and that the individual 
with ability 𝜀௧ will just earn the minimum wage, 𝑦. Workers with ability smaller than 𝜀௧ will 
be unemployed, which implies that the unemployment rate is:  
 𝑢௧ = 1 − ቄ ௕ఌ೟ቅ
ఈ      (18) 
The total number of effective units of labour possessed (and supplied) by those individuals 
with 𝑒௜ ≥ 𝜀௧  is, 
𝐿௦ = ׬ 𝑒 ቄ𝛼 ௕ഀ௘ഀశభቅ 𝑑𝑒 =
ఈ
ఈିଵ
ஶ
ఌ ቄ
௕
ఌ೟ቅ
ఈ 𝜀௧    (19) 
We can thus describe the condition describing equilibrium in the labour market (i.e. the 
analogue of equation (15) as:  
𝑁௄𝐿௧௙ = ఈఈିଵ ቄ
௕
ఌ೟ቅ
ఈ 𝜀௧     (20)       
Α simple comparison of equations (15) and (20) reveals that –ceteris paribus- a binding 
minimum wage constraint, which implies that 𝑏 < 𝜀, will be associated with a higher wage 
rate per effective unit of labour than in its absence (𝜛 > 𝑤), due to the reduction in the 
aggregate effective units of labour supply caused by the exclusion of the lowest-ability 
workers from employment.   
2.2.2 Government 
In addition to setting (and enforcing) the minimum wage constraint, the government is 
assumed to levy a comprehensive linear income tax (τ) on all sources of income (with the 
exception of unemployment benefits), 24  in order to finance benefits for the low-ability 
workers that are unemployed. This is a reasonable assumption in our context, since support 
                                                 
23 We assume that the minimum wage per unit of time is such that 𝑦 > 𝑏𝜛௧. 
24 None of our results hinges on this assumption. 
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for those that the MW regime denies employment (and in this sense, the unemployed 
“deserve” public support) is a policy that no proponent of minimum wages would object to. 
We assume that the level of the unemployment benefit is a fixed proportion of the minimum 
wage, i.e. it is equal to 𝜙𝑦 (0 < 𝜙 < 1) . 25  Equation (21), i.e. the government budget 
constraint, just states that the net payments to the unemployed are equal to the total tax 
receipts: 
𝜙𝑦𝑢௧ = 𝜏௧𝑌௧      (21) 
In what follows we shall assume that 𝜏௧ adjusts in every period so as to keep the government 
budget in balance. 
2.2.3 General Equilibrium 
The existence of taxes implies that equations (5), (7), and (9) must be modified to: 
𝐶௧,௜௅ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑒௜𝜛௧       (5a) 
𝐶௧௄ + 𝐾௧ାଵ௄ − (1 − 𝛿)𝛫௧௄ = (1 − 𝜏)(Π௧ + 𝑟௧𝐾௧௄)    (7a)     
𝐶௧ାଵ௄ = 𝛽((1 − 𝜏)𝑟௧ାଵ + 1 − 𝛿)𝐶௧௄    (9a) 
These three equations along with equations (16) – (21) describe the dynamic evolution of the 
system, whose long-run equilibrium is described by the following equations:  
𝐶௜௅ = (1 − 𝜏)𝑒௜𝜛      (LR1a) 
1 = 𝛽((1 − 𝜏)𝑟 + 1 − 𝛿)     (LR2a) 
𝐶௄ + 𝛿𝐾 = (1 − 𝜏)(Π + 𝑟𝐾)          (LR3a) 
𝑌 = [𝜃(𝐾)ఘ + (1 − 𝜃)(𝐿)ద]జ ద⁄     (LR4a) 
Π = (1 − 𝜐)𝑌                    (LR5a) 
𝑁௄𝐿 = ఈఈିଵ ቄ
௕
ఌቅ
ఈ 𝜀     (LR6a)  
                                                 
25 This assumption implies that for persons with ability well below the threshold level of ability, 𝜀, the 
level of unemployment benefits may exceed the income they would receive while employed in the 
absence of the minimum wage constraint. In the numerical simulations of the following sections we 
preclude this, by setting a low enough value for 𝜙. 
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𝜛 = 𝜐𝜃(𝐿)ఘିଵ[𝜃(𝐾)ఘ + (1 − 𝜃)(𝐿)ద](జିద) ద⁄    (LR7a) 
𝑟 = 𝜐(1 − 𝜃)(𝐾)ఘିଵ[𝜃(𝐾)ఘ + (1 − 𝜃)(𝐿)ద](జିద) ద⁄    (LR8a) 
𝑢 = 1 − ቄ௕ఌቅ
ఈ           (LR9) 
𝑦 = 𝜀𝜛                 (LR10) 
𝜙𝑦𝑢 = 𝜏𝑌                 (LR11)     
These equations determine the long-run values of 𝜛, 𝜀, r, u, K, L, Y, Π, 𝐶௄, 𝐶௜௅, and 𝜏. We 
note that the system is no longer recursive, since equation (LR2a) does not uniquely solve for 
r. Moreover, due to the nonlinearity of the system, it is not possible to exclude theoretically 
the possibility of multiple equilibria. Nevertheless, we can report that after extensive 
numerical simulations with a wide range of plausible parameter values we have not found a 
single case of multiple equilibria.  Nevertheless, we can draw some useful results by 
comparing the perfectly competitive (PC) with the minimum wage (MW) case.  
3    Comparison 
We now proceed to compare the equilibrium outcomes in the MW and PC cases, by focusing 
on long-run outcomes.26 Since it is impossible to derive closed-form solutions in the presence 
of the minimum- wage constraint, we resort to numerical calculations.  
3.1 Parameter values 
Table 1 reports the baseline parameter values for policy, technology and preferences used to 
obtain the long-run values of the endogenous variables. These values are similar to the ones 
used in macroeconomics (e.g. the business cycle literature). We set the baseline value of 𝜚, 
which determines the degree of substitutability between capital and labour in production, to -
0.1. This implies that the elasticity of factor substitution, 𝜎(= ଵଵିద), is equal to 0.909, but we 
report also results for 𝜚 = 0.5, and 𝜚 = −2, which imply that the elasticity of substitution is 
 
                                                 
26 We note that in the MW case, wage rates (per effective unit of labour) during the transition will be 
higher than in the steady-state, due to the monotonic decline in the capital stock to its lower level. 
This implies that our focus on long-run outcomes alone – instead of including the transition path in 
our calculations - biases the comparison against the MW case. We abstain from reporting 
comparisons involving appropriately discounted values since they do not alter substantially the main 
implications of our analysis.       
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Table 1: Baseline parameterization 
Parameters Description Value 
θ Capital’s share parameter in production function 0.25 
σ Elasticity of substitution between capital and labour 0.909 
ι Measure of returns to scale 0.8 
δ Capital’s depreciation rate 0.08 
β Rate of time preference 0.98 
b Lowest ability in the population of workers 1 
α Shape parameter of the Pareto distribution 2 
φ Welfare benefits replacement ratio (% of minimum wage) 0.35 
Nk/ (Nk +NL) Share of capitalists in population 0.30 
  
equal to 2 and 0.33 (respectively). Most empirical studies tend to find values for the elasticity 
of substitution which are smaller than 1 - but closer to 1 than to 0 (Antras, 2004); among the 
limited number of studies which presented elasticity estimates larger than 1 (e.g. Berndt, 
1976), these were not statistically different from 1 – thus the other two values used for 𝜚 
should be considered as providing a wide “confidence internal” for empirically plausible 
values of the elasticity of substitution.27 The value of the distribution parameter, 𝜃, is set at 
0.25, so as to ensure that the labour share is close to 60 percent; according to the Ameco 
database (data accessed on April 22, 2014), the adjusted28 wage (i.e. labour) share was on 
average 58.2% of GDP for the (12) euro area countries during 1991-2012 when evaluated at 
market prices, and 65.5% when evaluated at factor cost.  
Parameter 𝜐 , which measures the returns to scale is set at 0.8, 29  implying that the 
production function is characterized by diminishing returns to scale, thus allowing for positive 
profits equal to 20 percent of output. These shares are consistent with observed data. For 
example, according to Eurostat (data accessed on April 22, 2014), for non-financial 
corporations, net entrepreneurial income (which is gross operating surplus plus all property 
income received minus interest and rents paid, and which approximates the concept of pre-tax 
                                                 
27 Our choice of the baseline value for 𝜎 to be lower than 1 is also influenced by the fact that with the 
CES production function an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor greater than 1 would 
imply that production is possible without labor or without capital, which appears – at the current state 
of technology – implausible (see, e.g. Acemoglu, 2009, p. 519). Despite these reservations, we 
present also results for the case that 𝜎 > 1.  
28 Adjusted for the existence of self-employed persons.  
29 We report also results for 𝜐 = 0.7 and 𝜐 = 0.9. 
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corporate profits in business accounting) as a percentage of net value added, was 32.7 percent 
on average for the (12) euro area countries during 2002-2012. (During the same period, gross 
operating surplus was 39% of gross value added on average for the same group of countries.) 
The time preference rate, 𝛽, and the capital depreciation rate, 𝛿, are set at 0.98 and 0.08 
respectively, which are standard values for these parameters in the literature. In accordance 
with the relevant empirical studies, we set the baseline value of parameter 𝑎,  which 
determines the shape of the Pareto distribution and is a measure of income inequality among 
workers, equal to 2, and its “extreme” values to 1.5 and 2.5.30 Parameter 𝑏, which stands for 
the lowest ability in the population of workers, can be chosen arbitrarily so that the model’s 
equilibrium values of the endogenous variables match well with actual economies; we set it to 
1.31 The baseline value for parameter  𝜑 , which is the ratio of unemployment (or, social 
welfare) benefits to the minimum wage, is set at 0.35, but we also provide results for larger 
values of 𝜑  (and discuss the implications of smaller values as well). It is clear that the 
generosity of unemployment benefit schemes differs a lot among countries, and we note that 
even though the baseline value chosen here may appear on the low side of actual 
unemployment benefit schemes, remember that in this model the granting of these benefits 
has an indefinite duration. In this sense, it should be compared more with the social assistance 
provided to individuals whose eligibility for unemployment benefits has expired, or those 
who have never fulfilled the eligibility criteria for receiving them.  
Finally, we assume that the number of capitalists/entrepreneurs as a share of the total 
population, 𝑁/(1 + 𝑁), is equal to 0.3, but we also provide results for the cases that workers 
comprise either 65 or 75 percent of the population. We report that the substance of our results 
is robust to changes in the above parameter values. 
3.2 Numerical solution and discussion of results  
Using the baseline parameterization discussed in Table 1, the long-run equilibrium values for 
the perfectly competitive (PC) and the minimum wage (MW) economies described earlier are 
presented in Tables 2a-2d. These long-run equilibrium values solutions follow from solving 
the systems (LR1-LR8) and (LR1a-LR8a, LR9-LR11) respectively.  
In Tables 2a-2d the results are displayed as follows. The PC column represents (for 
different values of the elasticity of substitution), the long-run values of the perfectly 
 
                                                 
30 We note that the relationship between parameter 𝛼 and the Gini coefficient, 𝐺, is 𝐺 = 1/(2𝛼 − 1), 
implying that when 𝛼 = 2, 𝐺 = 0.33, which is close to observed estimates for income inequality. 
31 This is just a normalization; different values of b would not affect the qualitative nature of the results. 
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Table 2a: Comparative static results with respect to σ in the presence of a linear income 
tax (τ) on all sources of income ( λ = 0.10 ) 
 
Variable 
σ = 2 σ = 0.909 σ = 0.33 
PC MW PC MW PC MW 
w 0.4788 - 0.4853 - 0.4870 - 
y - 0.5267 - 0.5339 - 0.5357 
 - 0.4865 - 0.4928 - 0.4944 
ε - 1.0826 - 1.0833 - 1.0835 
K 3.5376 -7.7% 2.1599 -7.9% 1.6431 -7.8% 
L 1.40 -7.6% 1.40 -7.7% 1.40 -7.7% 
CL (for e = b) 0.4788 - 0.4853 - 0.4870 - 
CL (for e = ε) 0.5184 0% 0.5257 -0.3% 0.5277 -0.5% 
CK 1.0953 -8.0% 0.8939 -8.0% 0.8174 -8.0% 
u 0 0.1028 (0.1468) 0 
0.1035 
(0.1479) 0 
0.1037 
(0.1482) 
τ 0 0.0158 0 0.0184 0 0.0196 
% of employed workers 
for which CLMW ≥ CLPC 
 
- 
 
0.00 
 
- 
 
0.00 
 
- 
 
0.00 
LI 2.2345 -5.0% 2.2649 -5.1% 2.2725 -5.3% 
Post-tax and -transfers LS 0.5229 1.4% 0.6064 1.2% 0.6441 1.0% 
Notes to tables 2a-2d: Numbers in bold imply exogenously set policy variables. Also, the MW columns 
present the equilibrium values of the various variables or, wherever applicable, their percentage changes 
from the PC case. 
competitive, full-employment case, whereas the MW columns represent the outcomes if a 
minimum wage (per unit of time) is imposed which is arbitrarily or institutionally set higher 
than the wage (per unit.in the PC case; i.e. 𝑦 = (1 + 𝜆)(𝑏𝑤) = (1 + 𝜆)𝑤, 𝜆 > 0 .32 More 
specifically, the MW columns in Tables 2a-2d present the equilibrium values of the various 
variables or, wherever applicable, their percentage changes from the PC case. We focus on 
the case that λ = 0.10, but we also discuss results from the imposition of a minimum wage 
which is 30% higher (λ = 0.30) than the wage which the worker with the lowest ability 
would receive in the PC case. In these Tables the parameter describing the generosity of the 
                                                 
32 In principle, instead of simply setting this exogenous rule for the determination of the minimum 
wage, we could, as one referee suggested, postulate a social welfare function and derive the “optimal” 
minimum wage. Nevertheless, any results derived in such a case would depend strongly on the type 
and parameterization of the social welfare function, e.g. one which gives progressively lower weight 
to higher income individuals (Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 1977). Moreover, this would require that the 
government knows the ability of each individual - an assumption which the optimal taxation literature 
has not been willing to entertain since Mirrlees (1971).  
ϖ
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unemployment benefit system is arbitrarily set at ϕ = 0.35  – the reasons for setting 
unemployment benefits at 35% of the minimum wage will become apparent shortly. 
The imposition of a minimum wage in an otherwise perfectly competitive economy 
implies a cost in terms of aggregate (and, per-capita) output and consumption in the long run. 
(For brevity, we do not report the results for these variables; we report, however, the 
outcomes for the amounts of capital and labour employed in the economy.) This arises since 
with a binding minimum wage (per unit of time) firms will not be willing to employ the 
lowest ability workers, but only those whose ability times the market-determined wage rate, 
ϖ , is larger than the institutionally set minimum wage. The resulting exclusion from 
employment of some low-ability workers decreases the aggregate units of effective labour 
employed, increases, at the initial capital stock, the marginal product of (effective) labour, and 
the wage rate, 𝜛, per effective unit of labour. These developments lead to a lower capital 
stock in the long run, which, in combination, with the smaller labour input lead to lower 
aggregate output, and a lower level of aggregate profits. 
In Table 2a, when the elasticity of substitution is equal to 0.909 (𝜚 = −0.1), the wage rate 
(per effective unit of labour) in the PC case is 𝑤 = 0.4853 , thus we set the minimum wage 
(per unit of time) at 𝑦 = (1 + 𝜆)𝑤 = 1.1 𝑤 = 0.5339. As a result, the firms will not be 
willing to employ the low-ability workers, and the unemployment rate (expressed as a share 
of the total population) will rise to 𝑢 = 10.35%. These developments are associated with a 
rise in the wage rate to 𝜛 = 0.4928, i.e. a rise in the wage rate relative to the PC case by 
1.55%. The significantly smaller percentage rise in the wage rate than the 10% minimum-
wage premium over the competitive wage (per unit of time) is mostly due to the reduction in 
the steady-state capital stock33 under the MW regime brought about by the reduced incentives 
for capital accumulation generated by the higher cost of labour and the taxes needed to 
support the unemployed. As a result, all workers remaining in employment become worse-off, 
since their (after-tax) income and consumption decrease relative to the PC case; e.g. when 
 𝜎 = 0.909, the consumption of the worker whose ability is equal to the threshold ability level 
(𝜀 = 1.0833) decreases from 0.5257 in the PC case to 0.5241 in the MW case (a drop of 
0.3%). (Since the tax rate is linear in income (and ability), the percentage decline in after-tax 
income is the same for all workers remaining in employment.) The corresponding decrease in 
the consumption of all workers below the threshold level of ability – i.e. those that become 
unemployed after the imposition of the MW – is very large; the consumption of the lowest 
ability worker (𝑒 = 𝑏 = 1) drops from 0.4853 in the PC case to 0.1869 (=𝜙𝑦) in the MW 
case – a reduction by 61.5%.34  As expected, capitalists are also harmed by the imposition of 
                                                 
33 The reduction in the capital stock is equal to 7.6% relative to the PC case.  
34 The decline is even larger for the workers who have ability levels 𝑒 ∈ [𝑏, 𝜀).  
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the minimum wage – their consumption in the long-run drops by 8.0% relative to the PC case. 
Thus, the imposition of a “moderately binding”35 minimum wage (𝜆 = 0.10), when combined 
with “moderate” support for the unemployed (𝜙 = 0.35), generates decreases in income and 
consumption of all groups (employed and unemployed workers, and capitalists) in the 
economy.     
Table 2a reveals that similar reductions in (employed and unemployed) workers’ and 
capitalists’ incomes obtain in the long run due to the imposition of a minimum wage if we 
assume a smaller elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, e.g. when σ = 0.33. 
But what if σ is significantly higher? Table 2a reveals that if σ = 2, the imposition of the 
minimum wage will not reduce the after-tax incomes and consumption of employed workers 
– although it would still induce large reductions in the consumption of capitalists and of the 
low-ability workers who lose their jobs. Although we do not report it here, we have verified 
that if the elasticity of substitution is higher than 2, it would be possible to increase the 
consumption of employed workers. This is understandable since a high elasticity of 
substitution makes the reduction in the effective units of labour at the capitalists’ disposal 
easier to deal with via an increase in the (relative) use of capital, thus inducing a smaller 
reduction in the capital stock than otherwise.36 Nevertheless, since the weight of the empirical 
evidence indicates that the elasticity of substitution is smaller than 1 – let alone 2, in what 
follows we shall concentrate on deriving implications of our analysis by regarding 2 as the 
upper bound for the value of the elasticity of factor substitution.  
It would be wrong to conclude from Table 2a that the imposition of a minimum wage 
cannot increase the (after-tax incomes and) consumption of employed workers, since their 
values depend on assuming that unemployed workers receive welfare benefits equal to 35% 
of the minimum wage, i.e. the benefit replacement ratio, 𝜙, is 0.35. Given the rest of the 
parameter values, 𝜙 = 0.35  provides an approximate 37  threshold above which even the 
employed workers become worse-off under the MW regime; similarly, if very little support 
                                                 
35 It is not clear how big is the difference between existing minimum wages (per unit of time) and the 
hypothetical wage (per unit of time) that the lowest ability worker would earn in a perfectly 
competitive market. For one thing, no actual labour market can be considered as perfectly 
competitive even in the absence of a national minimum wage. Nevertheless, a rough approximation 
may be available if one looks at the German (non-union) low-wage sector. For example, Bosch and 
Kalina (2008) report that in 2006, 1.9 million workers (about 6.5% of the workforce) were earning 
less than €5 per hour; press reports indicate that some workers were earning substantially less than 
that – see, e.g. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/08/us-germany-jobs-
idUSTRE8170P120120208). Given the small increases in wages in Germany since 2006, the €8.5 per 
hour minimum wage will certainly be far larger than the 10% and 30% premium on the lowest-ability 
workers assumed here, and for this reason we put the adjective moderate on the 10% premium. 
36 The percentage reduction in capitalists’ consumption is smaller as well in this case.  
37 It is an “approximate” threshold since changes in the rest of the parameter values produce small 
changes to it.   
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was provided for the unemployed (𝜙<0.20), then we have verified that under any set of 
plausible parameter values the employed workers would become better-off if a moderately 
binding minimum wage was set like the one whose effects are presented in Table 2a; 
however, the unemployed and the capitalists would still lose from it.  
Before we move away from the case of a comprehensive linear tax, we point the reader’s 
attention to Tables 2b-2d. Table 2b differs from Table 2a in only one dimension. It displays 
the effects of a “heavily binding” minimum wage, i.e. one that sets the minimum wage (per 
unit of time) at 30% above (λ = 0.30) what the lowest-ability worker would earn under 
competitive conditions (per unit of time). This Table reveals that such a policy would be even 
more self-defeating (relative to Table 2a) for the (relatively) high-ability workers that remain 
employed; their (after-tax) income and consumption would drop relative to the PC case since 
(i) they would have to shoulder a heavier tax burden in order to finance the welfare benefits 
for the significantly higher number of unemployed and (ii) the capitalists’ (further) reduced 
incentives for capital accumulation would lead to greater declines in the capital stock and the 
demand for labour. This implies that under a “heavily binding” minimum wage the employed   
workers can be made better-off only if the support provided to the unemployed is very 
 
Table 2b:Comparative static results with respect to σ in the presence of a linear income 
tax (τ) on all sources of income ( λ = 0.30) 
 
Variable 
σ = 2 σ = 0.909 σ = 0.33 
PC MW PC MW PC MW 
w 0.4788 - 0.4853 - 0.4870 - 
 - 0.6224 - 0.6309 - 0.6331 
 - 0.4993 - 0.5053 - 0.5068 
ε - 1.2465 - 1.2486 - 1.2492 
K 3.5376 -21.3% 2.1599 -21.41% 1.6431 -20.61% 
L 1.40 -19.7% 1.40 -19.9% 1.40 -20.0% 
CL (for e = b) 0.4788 -54.5% 0.4853 -54.5% 0.4870 -54.5% 
CL (for e = ε) 0.5968 -1.0% 0.6060 -2.0% 0.6084 -2.5% 
CK 1.0953 -20.9% 0.8939 -21.51% 0.8174 -21.54% 
u 0 0.2494 (0.3564) 0 
0.2510 
(0.3586) 0 
0.2515 
(0.3592) 
τ 0 0.0508 0 0.0593 0 0.0630 
% of employed workers 
for which CLMW ≥ CLPC 
 
- 
 
0.00 
 
- 
 
0.00 
 
- 
 
0.00 
LI 2.2345 -12.5% 2.2649 -13.40% 2.2725 -13.76% 
Post-tax and -transfers LS 0.5229 4.9% 0.6064 3.8% 0.6441 3.2% 
Notes: Numbers in bold imply exogenously set policy variables. Also, the MW columns present the 
equilibrium values of the various variables or, wherever applicable, their percentage changes from the PC case. 
y
ϖ
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limited – our numerical results suggest that ϕ < 0.10 is a necessary condition for such an 
outcome.  
Table 2d presents the effects from varying the assumed percentage of capitalists in the 
population, and it shows that these variations do not alter the broad picture established by the 
previous Tables. Further experimentation with variations in other assumed parameter values 
(e.g. the share of profits in aggregate income) has verified that under a comprehensive linear 
tax the imposition of a binding minimum wage can increase the (after-tax) income of those 
remaining in employment but only if the support provided to the unemployed is far below 
what they could earn under a PC regime. 
In summary, our findings indicate that the presence of worker heterogeneity and the 
existence of another distinct social class (i.e. capitalists) are crucial for the creation of a 
political majority for the MW institution. Worker heterogeneity is important since in its 
absence the fall in the expected wage income of all workers (as the probability of 
unemployment would be the same for all workers) would have all workers be against any 
unemployment-creating minimum inefficiency introduced by the minimum wage would harm 
the  workers  as  there  would  be  no  other  group  on  which  the  cost  of inefficiency can be 
Table 2c: Comparative static results with respect to α in the presence of a linear income 
tax (τ) on all sources of income ( λ = 0.10) 
 
Variable 
α = 1.5 α = 2.0 α = 2.5  
PC MW PC MW PC MW 
w 0.4386 - 0.4853 - 0.5079 - 
y - 0.4825 - 0.5339 - 0.5587 
 - 0.4423 - 0.4928 - 0.5188 
ε - 1.0908 - 1.0833 - 1.0769 
K 2.9552 -4.3% 2.1599 -7.9% 1.8759 -10.9% 
L 2.10 -4.25% 1.40 -7.7% 1.1667 -10.5% 
CL (for e = b) 0.4386 -61.5% 0.4853 -61.48% 0.5079 -61.5% 
CL (for e = ε) 0.4784 -0.1% 0.5257 -0.3% 0.5470 -0.5% 
CK 1.2159 -4.4% 0.8939 -8.0% 0.7784 -10.95% 
u 0 0.0856 0 0.1035 0 0.1184 
τ 0 0.0098 0 0.0184 0 0.0259 
% of employed workers for 
L L
      
LI 3.0703 -2.82% 2.2649 -5.13% 1.9751 -7.06% 
Post-tax and -transfers LS 0.6051 0.62% 0.6064 1.18% 0.6070 1.68% 
Notes: Numbers in bold imply exogenously set policy variables. Also, the MW columns present the 
equilibrium values of the various variables or, wherever applicable, their percentage changes from the PC 
case. 
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Table 2d: Comparative static results with respect to Nk/ (Nk +NL) in the presence of a 
linear income tax (τ) on all sources of income ( λ = 0.10) 
 
Variable 
Nk/ (Nk +NL) = 0.25 Nk/ (Nk +NL) = 0.30 Nk/ (Nk +NL) = 0.35 
PC MW PC MW PC MW 
w 0.4558 - 0.4853 - 0.5137 - 
y - 0.5014 - 0.5339 - 0.5651 
 - 0.4629 - 0.4928 - 0.5217 
ε - 1.0832 - 1.0833 - 1.0832 
K 2.1860 -8.0% 2.1599 -8.0% 2.1121 -8.0% 
L 1.50 -7.70% 1.40 -7.70% 1.30 -7.70% 
CL (for e = b) 0.4558 -61.5% 0.4853 -61.5% 0.5137 -61.5% 
CL (for e = ε) 0.4937 -0.3% 0.5257 -0.3% 0.5564 -0.3% 
CK 1.0817 -8.0% 0.8939 -8.0% 0.7517 -8.0% 
u 0 0.1108 (0.1477) 0 
0.1035 
(0.1479) 0 
0.0960 
(0.1477) 
τ 0 0.0184 0 0.0184 0 0.0184 
% of employed workers 
for which CLMW ≥ CLPC 
 
- 
 
0.00 
 
- 
 
0.00 
 
- 
 
0.00 
LI 2.7350 -5.13% 2.2649 -5.13% 1.9082 -5.13% 
Post-tax and -transfers LS 0.6056 1.18% 0.6064 1.18% 0.6072 1.18% 
Notes: Numbers in bold imply exogenously set policy variables. Also, the MW columns present the equilibrium values of 
the various variables or, wherever applicable, their percentage changes from the PC case. 
transferred to and from which workers extract a larger share of output. The above also imply 
that the specific functional form used for the production function is not essential for our 
results.  
4.    Non-Linear Taxes 
Actual tax systems are not characterized by the existence of a single, linear tax rate on all 
sources of income. We thus enquire in this section to what extent our previous conclusions 
should be modified once we allow for tax progressivity and greater flexibility in extracting 
taxes for the funding of welfare support to the unemployed.   
4.1 Progressive Taxes 
We introduce progressive taxation in the model in a very simple way. That is, we impose a 
single tax rate on all sources of income, but for labour income alone, any income below a 
threshold level, 𝑧 , goes untaxed. We continue assuming that unemployment benefits are 
untaxed, and – for simplicity -we set 𝑧 equal to what the lowest ability worker would receive 
ϖ
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in the PC case, i.e. 𝑧 = 𝑏𝑤. As a result, equations (LR1a) and (LR11) – which correspond to 
the consumption of workers and the government budget constraint – should be modified to:  
𝐶௜௅ = 𝑒௜𝜛 − 𝜏(𝑒௜𝜛 − 𝑏𝑤)                                          (LR1b) 
𝜙𝑦𝑢 = 𝜏(𝑌 − (1 − 𝑢)𝑏𝑤)                                (LR11a)     
The right-hand-side of equation (LR11a) represents tax revenue. These are equal to the 
(single) tax rate times the part of aggregate income which is subject to taxation. The latter is 
equal to aggregate income, 𝑌, minus the aggregate labour income which is not subject to 
taxation (which is equal to the number of employed workers (1 − 𝑢) times the untaxed level 
of labour income (𝑏𝑤)).    
Table 3a displays the steady-state outcomes for the PC and MW regimes under the 
modified tax structure for 𝜆 = 0.10. Whereas in Table 2a values of the benefit replacement 
ratio (𝜙) as low as 0.35 resulted in no employed workers being made better-off under the MW 
regime, in Table 3a as many as 89% of the employed workers (when 𝜎 = 2) could be made 
better-off from the introduction of the MW; the proportion of employed workers which 
become better-off declines to 74%, when 𝜎 = 0.9, and to 67% when 𝜎 = 0.33. The employed 
workers which become better-off are the ones whose ability is not too-high, i.e. the ones that 
(due to the tax exemption) would face a smaller increase in their tax burden than the rise in 
the wage rate, 𝜛, which the MW regime would generate. By analogy, the high-ability workers 
– as well as the capitalists - would have to shoulder a larger part of the tax burden, and their 
after-tax incomes would decline.38  
This is an instance in which minimum wages cause a two-sided redistribution even among 
workers - in the sense that the MW regime can reduce the after-tax incomes of both (very) 
low-ability and (very) high-ability workers. This can, in turn, reduce the political feasibility of 
minimum wages if they are combined with substantial welfare support for the unemployed. 
For example, Table 3a reveals that if 𝜙=0.5, only 40% of employed workers would benefit 
from the MW regime if 𝜎 = 0.9. This implies that if voters cared only about their own after-
tax incomes, there would be a strong majority in the population against the MW regime; this 
majority would consist of the 60% of employed workers, and the entirety of capitalists (30% 
of voters) and of the unemployed workers. Such outcomes can potentially explain differences 
in attitudes between Scandinavian and Southern European countries; a well-developed social 
 
                                                 
38 The reader can verify that the percentage decline in the consumption of capitalists due to the MW 
regime is larger in Table 3a than the corresponding case in Table 2a.  
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Table 3a:  Comparative static results with respect to σ in the presence of non-linear taxes  
(λ = 0.10) 
Notes: Numbers in bold imply exogenously set policy variables. Also, the MW columns present the equilibrium values of the various 
variables or, wherever applicable, their percentage changes from the PC case. 
safety net in Scandinavia tends to co-exist with the absence of a national minimum wage, 
whereas in Southern Europe nationally binding (and relatively-high) national minimum wages 
are usually paired with the absence of a well-developed social safety net.39  
                                                 
39 For example, currently in Greece the unemployment rate is close to 20% and yet only one in ten of 
the unemployed receive unemployment benefits; this is due to various strict eligibility criteria. 
Moreover, the monthly unemployment benefit is set at  €360 ( which is 55% of the minimum wage), 
is independent of previous earnings, and its maximum duration is 12 months; for those ineligible to 
receive unemployment benefits there exist some welfare benefits whose maximum monthly value (if 
eligibility criteria make it available) is €200.     
 
 
Variable 
σ = 2 σ = 0. 9  σ = 0.33 
PC 
MW 
PC 
MW PC MW 
φ=0.35 φ=0.5 φ=0.909 φ=0.35 φ=0.5 φ=0.909  φ=0.35 φ=0.5 
φ=0.90
9 
w 0.4788 - - - 0.4853 - - - 0.4870 - - - 
y - 0.5267 0.5267 0.5267 - 0.5339 0.5339 0.5339 - 0.5357 0.5357 0.5357 
 - 0.4859 0.4849 0.4817 - 0.4921 0.4909 0.4869 - 0.4936 0.4924 0.4884 
ε - 1.0839 1.0862 1.0935 - 1.0850 1.0877 1.0966 - 1.0852 1.0879 1.0968 
K 3.5376 -8.9% -11.4% -18.7% 2.1599 -8.9% -10.3% -14.9% 1.6431 -8.3% -9.0% -11.3% 
L 1.40 -7.7% -7.9% -8.6% 1.40 -7.8% -8.1% -8.8% 1.40 -7.9% -8.1% -8.8% 
CL (for e = b) 0.4788 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 0.4853 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 0.4870 -61.5%
-
45.0% 0.0% 
CLPC (for e = ε) 
CLMW (for e = ε)  
0.519 
1.3% 
0.5201 
1.0% 
0.5235 
0.0%  
0.5265 
1.2% 
0.5279 
0.8% 
0.5322 
-0.4%  
0.5285
1.1% 
0.5298
0.7% 
0.5341 
-0.4% 
CK 1.0953 -8.6% -10.4% -16.2% 0.8939 -8.9% -10.5% -15.3% 0.8174 -9.2% -10.3% -14.7% 
u 0 0.1041 (0.148) 
0.1067 
(0.152) 
0.1146 
(0.163) 0 
0.1053 
(0.150)
0.1083 
(0.154)
0.1179 
(0.168) 0 
0.1056
(0.150
) 
0.1086
(0.155
) 
0.1181 
(0.168) 
τ 0 0.0210 0.0311 0.0627 0 0.0259 0.0383 0.0769 0 0.0282 0.0416 0.0827 
% of employed 
workers for 
which CLMW ≥ 
CLPC 
 
- 
 
89.21 
 
57.19 
 
0.81 
 
- 
 
73.81 
 
40.07 
 
0.00 
 
- 
 
67.03 
 
35.06 
 
0.00 
LI 2.2345 -4.5% -4.2% -3.0% 2.2649 -5.0% -4.7% -3.9% 2.2725 -5.1% -4.9% -4.2% 
Post-tax and -
transfers LS 0.5229 2.1% 3.5% 7.6% 0.6064 1.7% 2.4% 4.8% 0.6441 1.4% 1.9% 3.6% 
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Arguably, it can also explain the US case as well.40 
The (apparent) political infeasibility of the MW regime when combined with generous 
welfare support for the unemployed -under the assumption that voters consider the present 
model as the true description of their environment - is in large part due to the reduction in the 
capital stock that the increase in taxation engenders. What if political reality allowed for 
different tax rates across income sources? This is the issue we now turn to.  
4.2 Exempting Capital Income from Taxation 
In addition to the having a part, 𝑧(= 𝑏𝑤), of labour income which is exempt from taxation, 
we now assume that all capital income (=𝑟𝐾) is also exempt from taxation. Moreover, we 
assume that political reality allows the burden of taxation to be split according to the 
following ad-hoc rule:  
𝜏௅ = 𝛾𝜏௄, > 0 ,                                                                                                         (22) 
where 𝜏௅ and 𝜏௄ stand for the tax rates on wages and on profits (respectively). This (ad-hoc) 
rule is introduced here in order to allow for a simple way of apportioning the burden of 
taxation that the MW generates.41 It also it implies that both 𝜏௅ and 𝜏௄ adjust endogenously 
so as to keep the government’s budget in balance –i.e. the model now admits one more 
endogenous variable and it involves one extra equation (equation 22). As a result, in the MW 
regime, the equations corresponding to the consumption of workers, capitalists and the 
government budget constraint are now modified to: 
𝐶௜௅ = 𝑒௜𝜛 −  𝜏௅(𝑒௜𝜛 − 𝑏𝑤)                                                  (LR1c) 
                                                 
40 This raises an important question: why have some countries developed generous and efficient social 
welfare systems while eschewing the nationally determined minimum wage institution, whereas other 
countries relied on the latter as a way to address the lack of an adequate social safety net? Aghion et 
al. (2011) argue that the quality of labour relations in a country (as evidenced in the level of trust in 
labour relationships and the degree of unionization) may be inversely related to the state’s regulation 
of the minimum wage institution, with the causality running both ways: on the one hand, stringent 
minimum wage regulations discourage social investments in labor relations; on the other hand, low 
investments in labor relations induce democratic governments to introduce minimum wage policies to 
protect the median voter. We may think that a similar two-way causality is involved in the present 
paper: on the one hand, a generous social welfare state shuns minimum wage legislation since the 
financial cost of the unemployment generated by the minimum wage is high; on the other hand, the 
existence of a minimum wage (especially of a high one) prevents – by making it very costly – the 
emergence of a an adequate social safety net. 
41 It would be straightforward to allow for a non-zero tax rate on capital income which differs from the 
other tax rates by imposing another similar rule.   
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1 = 𝛽(𝑟 + 1 − 𝛿)                                                           (LR2c) 
𝐶௄ + 𝛿𝐾 = (1 − 𝜏௄)Π + 𝑟𝐾                                             (LR3c)                                             
𝜙𝑦𝑢 = 𝜏௅ ቂ ఈఈିଵ ቄ
௕
ఢቅ
ఈ 𝜛 − (1 − 𝑢)𝑏𝑤ቃ + 𝜏௄Π.                      (LR11b)     
Equation (LR11b) just states that the value of unemployment benefit payments must equal the 
government’s total tax receipts. The receipts equal the sum of the profit-tax revenue (𝜏௄Π), 
and the taxes raised on labour income; the latter are equal to the total income of employed 
workers (i.e. the total effective units of labour employed times the wage rate (= ఈఈିଵ ቄ
௕
ఢቅ
ఈ 𝜛) 
minus the total income of employed workers which is exempt from taxation (=(1 − 𝑢)𝑏𝑤)) 
times the tax rate on wage income.  
Table 3b displays the comparison between the PC and MW regimes in the case that 
𝛾 = 0.20, and for 𝜆 = 0.10. The reduced tax burden which employed workers now face, 
allows for all employed workers to be better-off under the MW regime – independently of the 
value of the elasticity of substitution - even when the welfare support provided to the 
unemployed is fairly generous, i.e. 𝜙=0.50. This implies a majority in favour of the MW 
regime. We note that the MW regime could still be supported by a majority even if welfare 
support to the unemployed is very generous, i.e. 𝜙=0.80, since when 𝜎 = 0.9 (or 𝜎 = 2) there 
would still be 86% (or 92%) among the employed workers who would be better off with the 
MW regime. If the elasticity of substitution is small (𝜎 = 0.33),  only 82% among the 
employed workers would be in favour of the MW regime, thus, if only income mattered for 
voting decisions, the capitalists (30% of voters), the 18% of employed workers losing from 
the MW (about 11% of voters), and the unemployed (about 10% of voters) could form a 
narrow majority against the MW regime.  
Naturally, such a transfer of the tax burden toward the capitalists would result in a far 
higher reduction in their after-tax income and consumption (relative to the PC case) than 
when there is a common tax rate on wage and profit income (Table 3a). As a result, the 
change in the post-tax and-transfers share of aggregate income appropriated by workers, LS, 
would be substantial; i.e. the MW regime would increase it by 3 percentage points (from 
60.6% to 63.6%) relative to the PC case even when the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour is close to 1 (𝜎 = 0.9). The concomitant increase in political power by the 
workers to shape future policy would be enhanced considerably. 
Before discussing further, the possible political economy ramifications, we note that the 
results remain substantially unaltered as the proportion of capitalists in the population 
changes (Table 3c) or in the shape of the ability distribution (not reported). Nevertheless, it is 
worth reporting the effects of  imposing  a  heavily-binding  minimum wage (𝜆 = 0.30) under  
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Table 3b : Comparative static results with respect to σ  when capital income is exempt 
from taxation (λ = 0.10, γ = 0.2) 
 
 
Variable 
σ = 2  σ = 0.9  σ = 0.33 
PC MW PC MW PC MW 
φ=0.35 φ=0.5 φ=0.909 φ=0.35 φ=0.5 φ=0.909 φ=0.35 φ=0.5 φ=0.909 
w 0.4788 - - - 0.4853 - - - 0.4870 - - - 
y - 0.5267 0.5267 0.5267 - 0.5339 0.5339 0.5339 - 0.5357 0.5357 0.5357 
 - 0.4881 0.4881 0.4881 - 0.4947 0.4947 0.4947 - 0.4962 0.4962 0.4962 
ε - 1.0790 1.0790 1.0790 - 1.0793 1.0793 1.0793 - 1.0797 1.0797 1.0797 
K 3.5376 -3.7% -3.7% -3.7% 2.1599 -5.7% -5.7% -5.7% 1.6431 -6.8% -6.8% -6.8% 
L 1.40 -7.3% -7.3% -7.3% 1.40 -7.4% -7.4% -7.4% 1.40 -7.4% -7.4% -7.4% 
CL (for e = b) 0.4788 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 0.4853 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 0.4870 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 
CL (for e = ε) 0.5166 1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 0.5238 1.8% 1.8% 1.6% 0.5258 1.7% 1.7% 1.5% 
CK 1.0953 -8.9% -10.8% -15.8% 0.8939 -10.8% -13.0% -19.1% 0.8174 -11.6% -14.0% -20.6% 
u 0 0.0988 (0.141) 
0.0988 
(0.141) 
0.0988 
(0.141) 0 
0.0991 
(0.142) 
0.0991 
(0.142) 
0.0991 
(0.142) 0 
0.0995 
(0.142) 
0.0995 
(0.142) 
0.0995 
(0.142) 
τ L 0 0.0116 0.0166 0.0302 0 0.0132 0.0188 0.0342 0 0.0138 0.0198 0.0360 
 τ π  0 0.0582 0.0831 0.1511 0 0.0658 0.0940 0.1709 0 0.0692 0.0989 0.1798 
% of employed workers 
for which CLMW ≥ CLPC 
 
- 
 
100.00 
 
100.00 
 
83.67 
 
- 
 
100.00 
 
100.00 
 
75.62 
 
- 
 
100.00 
 
99.47 
 
71.52 
LI 2.2345 -3.4% -2.5% -0.003% 2.2649 -3.5% -2.6% -0.25% 2.2725 -3.6% -2.7% -0.4% 
Post tax- and -transfers 
LS 0.5229 1.6% 2.5% 5.1% 0.6064 2.2% 3.1% 5.7% 0.6441 2.4% 3.3% 5.8% 
Notes: Numbers in bold imply exogenously set policy variables. Also, the MW columns present the equilibrium values of the various 
variables or, wherever applicable, their percentage changes from the PC case. 
the tax structure just discussed. Table 3d shows that if the political equilibrium allowed the 
workers to force the capitalists to accept a very high tax rate on profits, the increase in the LS 
would be enormous – an increase by 8 percentage points (even when 𝜎 = 0.90) relative to the 
PC case. However, this policy would create such high unemployment that it would be 
impossible to provide even moderate welfare support to the unemployed (e.g. 𝜙=0.35) and 
receive more than 50% of the popular vote. Moreover, the very large increase in the tax rate 
on profits which it would imply raises questions about its political feasibility.  
For this reason, in Tables 3e and 3f we depict cases of less “worker-friendly” ways of 
apportioning the burden of taxation that moderate increases in the MW (for λ=0.10) generate. 
In Table 3e, we have set γ=0.50 and observe that only if welfare support to the unemployed is 
moderate (ϕ=0.35) can there be a majority in favour of the MW. The higher tax burden that 
employed workers would have in this case (relative to when γ=0.20), generates a smaller 
ϖ
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proportion among employed workers that are in favour of the MW institution when ϕ=0.50, 
thus a majority of voters would be against it (i.e. all capitalists, the top 24% in terms of ability 
among the employed, and all the unemployed). 
In Table 3f we have set γ=1, and so this case is directly comparable to the one in Table 3a; 
the only difference between the two cases is that capital income is exempt from taxation 
regarding the results depicted in Table 3f. When the elasticity of substitution is below one 
(σ=0.9, σ=0.33), exempting capital income from taxation increases the proportion of 
employed workers who benefit from the imposition of a MW relative to when capital income 
is not exempt – for example, if ϕ=0.50, the proportions are 40% when capital income is not 
exempt, and 57% when it is. However, this increase in the proportion of employed workers is 
not sufficient to create a majority in favour of the MW. Moreover, the same holds true even if 
welfare support for the unemployed is limited (ϕ=0.35). We note that if σ=2, then the result is 
reversed, i.e. the proportion of employed workers that benefit from the MW decreases when 
capital income is exempt from taxation. This is because when the elasticity of factor 
substitution is high, the extra capital stock that the exemption of capital income from taxation 
would generate would not be as important as the further rise in the tax rate that employed 
workers would have to face if part of the potential tax base goes untaxed.42  (Naturally, the 
income, and consumption, of capitalists would be larger if capital income is exempted from 
taxation). 
In summary, the existence of progressive taxation creates a further cleavage between 
workers regarding the adoption of a MW regime, i.e. whereas under proportional taxation 
there is a cleavage between all employed workers and the unemployed, under progressive 
taxation a coalition may develop between the lowest- and the highest-ability workers who 
both may lose from the adoption of a MW regime. Nevertheless, the likelihood of a majority 
in favour of the MW regime that provides at least moderate welfare support to the 
unemployed increases if a progressive tax structure is in place.  
5    Politico-Economic Considerations     
From a normative perspective – which is not the focus of our analysis – it is not evident that 
the outcomes described in Sections 3 and 4 would induce a social planner whose objective is 
the maximization of some social welfare measure to impose a minimum wage. Assuming that 
social welfare is some (possibly weighted) aggregate of individual utilities, which in turn are 
functions of individual consumption alone, it is clear that – unless the social welfare function 
gives very small weight to the utility of the lowest-ability workers (who become unemployed) 
and to capitalists– social welfare would be lower in the MW regime than in the PC one. 
                                                 
42 Given the rest of the parameter values, this result would obtain for values of 𝜎 larger than 1.3, and it 
can potentially “rationalize” why taxing capital income remains popular despite its avowed 
detrimental effects on capital accumulation if the elasticity of factor substitution is high.    
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Table 3c: Comparative static results wrt Nk/ (Nk +NL)  when capital income is exempt from taxation ( λ = 0.10, γ = 0.2)  
 
 
Variable 
Nk/ (Nk +NL) = 0.25 Nk/ (Nk +NL) = 0.30  Nk/ (Nk +NL) = 0.35  
PC MW PC MW PC MW φ = 0.35 φ = 0.5 φ = 0.909 φ = 0.35 φ = 0.5 φ = 0.909 φ = 0.35 φ = 0.5 φ = 0.909 
w 0.4558 - - - 0.4853 - - - 0.5137 - - - 
y - 0.5014 0.5014 0.5014 - 0.5339 0.5339 0.5339 - 0.5651 0.5651 0.5651 
 - 0.4646 0.4646 0.4646 - 0.4947 0.4947 0.4947 - 0.5236 0.5236 0.5236 
ε - 1.0792 1.0792 1.0792 - 1.0793 1.0793 1.0793 - 1.0793 1.0793 1.0793 
K 2.1860 -5.7% -5.7% -5.7% 2.1599 -5.7% -5.7% -5.7% 2.1121 -5.7% -5.7% -5.7% 
L 1.50 -7.3% -7.3% -7.3% 1.40 -7.3% -7.3% -7.3% 1.30 -7.3% -7.3% _7.3% 
CL (for e = b) 0.4558 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 0.4853 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 0.5137 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 
CL (for e = ε) 0.4919 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 0.5238 1.8% 1.75% 1.6% 0.5544 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 
C K  1.0817 -10.8% -13.0% -19.1% 0.8939 -10.8% -13.0% -19.1% 0.7517 -10.8% -13.0% -19.1% 
u 0 0.1061 (0.1414) 
0.1061 
(0.1414) 
0.1061 
(0.1414) 0 
0.0991 
(0.1416) 
0.0991 
(0.1416) 
0.0991 
(0.1416) 0 
0.0920 
(0.1415) 
0.0920 
(0.1415) 
0.0920 
(0.1415) 
τ L 0 0.0131 0.0188 0.0341 0 0.0132 0.0188 0.0342 0 0.0132 0.0188 0.0342 
τ π 0 0.0656 0.0938 0.1705 0 0.0658 0.0940 0.1709 0 0.0658 0.0940 0.1719 
% of employed 
workers for which 
CLMW ≥ CLPC 
 
- 
 
100.00 
 
100.00 
 
75.94 
 
- 
 
100.00 
 
100.00 
 
75.62 
 
- 
 
100.00 
 
100.00 
 
75.93 
LI 2.7350 -3.5% -2.6% -0.2% 2.2649 -3.5% -2.6% -0.25% 1.9082 -3.5% -2.6% -0.25% 
Post tax- and -
transfers LS 0.6056 2.2% 3.1% 5.7% 0.6064 2.2% 3.1% 5.7% 0.6072 2.2% 3.1% 5.7% 
Notes: Numbers in bold imply exogenously set policy variables. Also, the MW columns present the equilibrium values of the various variables or, wherever applicable, 
their percentage changes from the PC case. 
ϖ
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Table 3d: Comparative static results with respect to σ  when capital income is exempt from taxation ( λ = 0.30, γ = 0.2 ) 
 
 
Variable 
σ = 2 σ = 0.9  σ = 0.33 
PC 
MW 
PC 
MW 
PC 
MW 
φ = 0.35 φ =0.5 φ =0.769 φ = 0.35 φ = 0.5 φ = 0.769 φ = 0.35 φ = 0.5 φ = 0.769  
w 0.4788 -  - 0.4853 -  - 0.4870 -  - 
y - 0.6224 0.6224 0.6224 - 0.6309 0.6309 0.6309 - 0.6331 0.6331 0.6331 
 - 0.5049 0.5049 0.5049 - 0.5114 0.5114 0.5114 - 0.5127 0.5127 0.5127 
ε - 1.2327 1.2327 1.2327 - 1.2337 1.2337 1.2337 - 1.2349 1.2349 1.2349 
K 3.5376 -9.8% -9.8% -9.8% 2.1599 -15.0% -15.0% -15.0% 1.6431 -17.6% -17.6% -17.6% 
L 1.40 -18.9% -18.9% -18.9% 1.40 -18.9% -18.9% -18.9% 1.40 -19.0% -19.0% -19.0% 
CL (for e = b) 0.4788 -54.5% -35.0% 0.0% 0.4853 -54.5% -35.0% 0.0% 0.4870 -54.5% -34.5% 0.0% 
CL (for e = ε) 0.5902 4.6% 4.2% 3.6% 0.5987 4.4% 4.0% 3.2% 0.6014 4.2% 3.8% -3.0% 
CK 1.0953 -24.2% -29.4% -38.7% 0.8939 -29.1% -35.3% -46.4% 0.8174 -31.2% -37.9% -49.8% 
u  0 0.2393 (0.3419) 
0.2393 
(0.3419) 
0.2393 
(0.3419) 0 
0.2400 
(0.3429) 
0.2400 
(0.3429) 
0.2400 
(0.3429) 0 
0.2410 
(0.3443) 
0.2410 
(0.3443) 
0.2410 
(0.3443) 
τ L 0 0.0355 0.0507 0.0779 0 0.0404 0.0577 0.0887 0 0.0426 0.0608 0.0936 
τ π  0 0.1773 0.2533 0.3897 0 0.2018 0.2883 0.4436 0 0.2129 0.3042 0.4679 
% of employed 
workers for which 
CLMW ≥ CLPC 
 
- 
 
100.00 
 
100.00 
 
80.89 
 
- 
 
100.00 
 
97.77 
 
69.53 
 
- 
 
100.00 
 
94.69 
 
63.35 
LI 2.2345 -8.5% -6.0% -1.5% 2.2649 -8.9% -6.5% -2.1% 2.2725 -9.2% -6.75% -2.4% 
Post tax- and -transfers 
LS 0.5229 4.9% 7.8% 13.1% 0.6064 6.8% 9.6% 14.7% 0.6441 7.3% 10.1% 15.2% 
Notes: Numbers in bold imply exogenously set policy variables. Also, the MW columns present the equilibrium values of the various variables or, wherever applicable, their 
percentage changes from the PC case. 
ϖ
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Table 3e: Comparative static results with respect to σ when capital income is exempt from taxation ( λ = 0.10, γ = 0.5 ) 
 
 
Variable 
σ = 2 σ = 0.9  σ = 0.33 
PC 
MW 
PC 
MW 
PC 
MW 
φ = 0.35 φ = 0.5 φ =0.909 φ = 0.35 φ = 0.5 φ = 0.909 φ = 0.35 φ = 0.5 φ = 0.35
w 0.4788 - - - 0.4853 - - - 0.4870 - - - 
y - 0.5267 0.5267 0.5267 - 0.5339 0.5339 0.5339 - 0.5357 0.5357 0.5357 
 - 0.4881 0.4881 0.4881 - 0.4947 0.4947 0.4947 - 0.4962 0.4962 0.4962 
ε - 1.0790 1.0790 1.0790 - 1.0793 1.0793 1.0793 - 1.0797 1.0797 1.0797 
K 3.5376 -3.7% -3.7% -3.7% 2.1599 -5.7% -5.7% -5.7% 1.6431 -6.8% -6.8% -6.8% 
L 1.40 -7.3% -7.3% -7.3% 1.40 -7.35% -7.35% -7.35% 1.40 -7.4% -7.4% -7.4% 
CL (for e = b) 0.4788 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 0.4853 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 0.4870 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 
CL (for e = ε) 0.5166 1.8% 1.7% 1.4% 0.5238 1.7% 1.6% 1.4% 0.5258 1.7% 1.6% 1.3% 
CK 1.0953 -7.9% -9.3% -13.0% 0.8939 -9.4% -11.0% -15.4% 0.8174 -10.0% -11.8% -16.5% 
u 0 0.0988 (0.1411) 
0.0988 
(0.1411) 
0.0988 
(0.1411) 0 
0.0991 
(0.1416) 
0.0991 
(0.1416) 
0.0991 
(0.1416) 0 
0.0995 
(0.1422) 
0.0995 
(0.1422) 
0.0995 
(0.1422) 
τ L 0 0.0219 0.0312 0.0568 0 0.0240 0.0342 0.0622 0 0.0249 0.0356 0.0647 
τ π 0 0.0437 0.0624 0.1135 0 0.0479 0.0685 0.1245 0 0.0498 0.0711 0.1293 
% of employed 
workers for which 
CLMW ≥ CLPC 
 
- 
 
98.10 
 
81.81 
 
46.85 
 
- 
 
94.59 
 
75.71 
 
41.40 
 
- 
 
91.93 
 
72.26 
 
38.34 
LI 2.2345 -3.9% -3.2% -1.4% 2.2649 -4.1% -3.4% -1.7% 2.2725 -4.2% -3.6% -1.85% 
Post tax- and -
transfers LS 0.5229 1.0% 1.7% 3.7% 0.6064 1.6% 2.3% 4.2% 0.6441 1.8% 2.45% 4.25% 
Notes: Numbers in bold imply exogenously set policy variables. Also, the MW columns present the equilibrium values of the various variables or, wherever applicable, their 
percentage changes from the PC case. 
ϖ
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Table 3f: Comparative static results with respect to σ when capital income is exempt from taxation (λ = 0.10, γ = 1)  
 
 
Variable 
σ = 2 σ = 0.9  σ = 0 .33 
PC MW PC MW PC MW φ = 0.35 φ = 0.5 φ = 0.909 φ = 0.35 φ = 0.5 φ = 0.909 φ = 0.35 φ = 0.5 φ = 0.909 
w 0.4788 - - - 0.4853 - - - 0.4870 - - - 
y - 0.5267 0.5267 0.5267 - 0.5339 0.5339 0.5339 - 0.5357 0.5357 0.5357 
 - 0.4881 0.4881 0.4881 - 0.4947 0.4947 0.4947 - 0.4962 0.4962 0.4962 
ε - 1.0790 1.0790 1.0790 - 1.0793 1.0793 1.0793 - 1.0797 1.0797 1.0797 
K 3.5376 -3.7% -3.7% -3.7% 2.1599 -5.7% -5.7% -5.7% 1.6431 -6.8% -6.8% -6.8% 
L 1.40 -7.3% -7.3% -7.3% 1.40 -7.35% -7.35% -7.35% 1.40 -7.4% -7.4% -7.4% 
CL (for e = b) 0.4788 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 0.4853 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 0.4870 -61.5% -45.0% 0.0% 
CL (for e = ε) 0.5166 1.7% 1.5% 1.2% 0.5238 1.6% 1.5% 1.1% 0.5258 1.6% 1.4% 1.1% 
C K 1.0953 -6.9% -7.9% -10.6% 0.8939 -8.2% -9.4% -12.4% 0.8174 -8.7% -9.9% -13.2% 
u 0 0.0988 (0.1411) 
0.0988 
(0.1411) 
0.0988 
(0.1411) 0 
0.0991 
(0.1416) 
0.0991 
(0.1416) 
0.0991 
(0.1416) 0 
0.0995 
(0.1422) 
0.0995 
(0.1422) 
0.0995 
(0.1422) 
τ L 0 0.0309 0.0441 0.0802 0 0.0330 0.0471 0.0857 0 0.0339 0.0484 0.0881 
τ π 0 0.0309 0.0441 0.0802 0 0.0330 0.0471 0.0857 0 0.0339 0.0484 0.0881 
% of employed workers 
for which CLMW ≥ CLPC 
 
- 
 
82.37 
 
61.10 
 
29.49 
 
- 
 
77.98 
 
56.69 
 
26.39 
 
- 
 
75.01 
 
53.89 
 
24.67 
LI 2.2345 -4.4% -3.9% -2.6% 2.2649 -4.5% -4.1% -2.9% 2.2725 -4.6% -4.2% -3.1% 
Post tax- and -transfers 
LS 0.5229 0.5% 1.0% 2.4% 0.6064 1.1% 1.6% 2.9% 0.6441 1.3% 1.8% 3.0% 
Notes: Numbers in bold imply exogenously set policy variables. Also, the MW columns present the equilibrium values of the various variables or, wherever applicable, their 
percentage changes from the PC case. 
ϖ
  ECONOMIDES, MOUTOS     Worker Heterogeneity and Popularity of Minimum Wage 
 
33 
 
However, this conclusion would not necessarily survive if we introduced a fixed disutility of 
leisure into our framework – e.g. by writing the individual (per-period) utility functions 
as 𝑈 = 𝑙𝑛𝐶 − 𝜗, where 𝜗 stands for the fixed (and common across individuals) disutility of 
work. In such a case, and as long as 𝜗 is very close to the 𝑙𝑛𝐶 which low-ability workers 
would receive in the PC case, it is possible that low ability workers would enjoy higher utility 
if the MW regime forced them out of work but received even meager unemployment benefits 
(e.g. 𝜙<0.20). Coupling these individual utility functions with social welfare functions which 
give progressively lower weight to higher income individuals (e.g. Atkinson, 1970; Sen, 
1977), it is possible to construct cases where the increased utility accruing to all workers more 
than offsets the loss of utility suffered by capitalists, and, as a result, social welfare increases. 
Nevertheless, since a proper treatment of this issue should allow for labour supply responses 
along both the extensive and intensive margin, we do not pursue this issue further here.  
If policy was determined according to the wishes of the majority under a comprehensive 
linear tax, Tables 2a-2d revealed that the MW regime would not win political support unless 
the welfare support provided to the unemployed was small. However, with progressive taxes 
in place, Tables 3a-3f revealed that a majority in favour of the MW regime could be formed 
even when the support provided to the unemployed was substantial. 
However, political scientists have long argued that unadulterated, fully participatory, 
majoritarian democracy describes no actual political system – rather, the translation of 
resources into influence occurs in highly institutionalized environments that amplify some 
voices and mute others (Ferguson, 1995; Bartels, 2008). For example, Gilens and Page 
(2014), on the basis of an analysis of 1,779 cases in U.S. policymaking between 1981 and 
2002, found that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have 
substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while average citizens (as 
captured by the median voter model) and mass-based interest groups have little or no 
independent influence.43 
The above imply that it may be more interesting to enquire whether labour organizations 
or political parties interested in furthering “working-class interests” would be in favour of the 
minimum wage policy if the perceived outcomes were the ones presented in Tables 2 and 3.  
If the objective of labour unions was to maximize the absolute value of (after-tax) income 
accruing to workers (both employed and unemployed), denoted by LI in the Tables, then the 
MW regime would be detrimental to their interests. 44 However, it is possible that labour 
                                                 
43 A famous case of pork-barrel politics in which business groups influenced policy is the Smoot-
Hawley tariff of 1930 (Schattschneider, 1935), despite the vociferous oppositions of many 
economists as evidenced in the appeal (drafted by Paul H. Douglas and signed by 1,028 economists) 
to President Herbert Hoover urging him to veto the Smoot-Hawley tariff.   
44 We note that we have followed standard economic discourse and assumed the existence of rational 
actors with stable, coherent, and autonomous preferences, which are not affected by the social 
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organizations may be willing to pay a price in terms of foregone income in order to gain in 
power relative to the capitalists. An index of the relative power of labour may be the share of 
after-tax income accruing to (employed and unemployed) workers – denoted by LS. Since the 
MW regime leads to a rise in LS (and a corresponding decline in the share received by 
capitalists), organized labour may be willing to pursue “inefficient” policies, which 
nonetheless may be instrumental in tilting future political power toward workers as the 
relative resources available to capitalists to influence other facets of economic and social 
policy become smaller. In this vein, Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) have argued that the 
politico-economic environment may have features whose removal may ex-ante look efficient 
(e.g. minimum wage legislation) if one does not take into account how their removal may 
affect the future political equilibrium. But, if their removal is associated with a shift of power 
away from labour, while enhancing the power of established (non-competitive) business 
interests and political elites, it can lead to emergence of policies that generate greater 
efficiency losses than those entailed by the policies which were removed. The upshot of these 
considerations is that minimum wages may be perceived by organized labour not only as way 
to further the interests of (some sections) of the working class at the expense of aggregate 
efficiency, but as a harbinger of efficiency enhancing policies (e.g. public education) due to 
the increased political power of the working class.   
6    Concluding Remarks   
We have constructed a model with heterogenous labour ability in which the imposition of a 
(binding) MW generates large disemployment effects. These effects arise not only because 
firms respond to the wage increase – relative to the static perfectly competitive benchmark – 
by moving upwards along a given labour demand curve, but also due to inward shifts of the 
labour demand curve as savers respond to decreases in the (net of taxes) rate of return on their 
savings by saving less, thus reducing the economy’s steady-state capital stock. Nevertheless, 
the large, long-run, declines in aggregate output, consumption, and the capital stock implied 
by this model do not render MW legislation unattractive for large segments of employed 
                                                                                                                                     
 
 
context. Gintis (2016) and Hoff and Stiglitz (2016) provide wide-ranging discussions of how social 
influences on preferences and cognition can influence the set of mental models upon which 
individuals can draw when making decisions, and how the resulting social rationality can lead to 
political action that matches better with observed behaviour than individual rationality. Participating 
in labour unions is one specific instance in which the resulting enculturation may alter individuals’ 
preferences and the lenses through which they make sense of the economic and political environment 
(Aghion et al., 2011). Incorporating these issues into our analysis is beyond the scope of the present 
paper.   
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workers, as long as they do not have to provide generous welfare support to the low-ability 
workers that the MW prevents them from finding employment.   
Tax structure plays an important role in generating political support for the MW regime. A 
progressive tax structure can assure political support for the MW regime in cases when 
moderate welfare support for the unemployed would not be politically viable under 
proportional taxation. However, even progressive taxation would not be sufficient to create a 
political majority for the MW if welfare support is very generous.  
With linear taxation we have shown that it is possible for the after-tax incomes of all 
employed workers to increase under a minimum-wage regime but only if the unemployed 
receive welfare payments significantly smaller than what their incomes would be in the 
competitive case. In other words, it is impossible for the minimum-wage regime to increase 
the after-tax aggregate income of (employed and unemployed) workers. The effects of 
minimum-wage legislation thus match with what Stigler (1970) termed Director’s Law – 
according to which public interventions are made for the primary benefit of the middle 
classes, and financed with taxes which are borne in considerable part by the (rich) capitalists 
and workers of the lowest ability who become unemployed. This message remains intact to a 
great extent even when non-linear (e.g. progressive) tax structures are considered.   
The paper takes as given the country’s existing arrangements regarding its tax structure 
and social welfare system.45 It also does not enquire as to whether there exist other ways of 
increasing the incomes of workers and which can avoid the inefficiency of MW-generated 
unemployment. For example, in the United States, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
provides a refundable tax credit to lower income working families through the tax system, and 
its goal is to increase the after-tax income of lower earning taxpayers, primarily those with 
children, while incentivizing work. It is clear that such policy interventions do not result in 
increases either in the gross or in the after-tax wage rate of employed workers. This implies 
that if the workers’ goal is to increase the wage they earn46, or to force firms to pay them a 
higher wage rate, then, from their point of view the MW is preferable to the EITC. Moreover, 
as long as workers’ organizations aim at increasing their (relative) power or influence over 
                                                 
45 It also ignores the possibility that the large disemployment effects of moderately binding minimum 
wages inherent in our model could, in principle, be partly countered – in the presence of sufficient 
political power – by public employment programmes. Assuming that these (low-ability) employees 
are remunerated at the legislated minimum (𝑦 ), and that the goods/services produced by these 
programmes provide some utility to households, it may be possible to construct cases for which this 
type of “policy complementarity” increases the political viability of minimum wages.           
46 Recent discussions during the latest US presidential elections focused on “takers” and “givers”, the 
former being citizens (but not corporations) who are recipients of government support. Recipients of 
government programmes like the EITC, despite being described as providing support to the 
“deserving poor”, may be classified in the public’s perception as “takers” whose privileges may be 
withdrawn at any point in time. In contrast, a rise in worker incomes caused by the imposition of a 
MW generates no such public perception.        
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policy, they will strive for increases in the post-tax-and-transfers labour share – which is 
something they can achieve through the MW institution, but not through policies like the 
EITC or through other “rewarding work”- type policies, e.g. employment subsidies targeted at 
the unskilled (see, e.g. Phelps, 1997; Sinn, 2000).  
References: 
Acemoglu, D. (2009), Introduction to Modern Economic Growth, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ.   
Acemoglu, D. and J.A. Robinson (2013),  Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy 
Advice , Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(2), 173-92. DOI: 10.1257/jep.27.2.173 
Adam, A. and T. Moutos (2011),  A politico-economic analysis of minimum wages and wage 
subsidies , Economics Letters, vol. 110(3), 171-173. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.029 
Aghion, P., Y. Algan, and P. Cahuc (2011),  Civil Society And The State: The Interplay 
Between Cooperation And Minimum Wage Regulation , Journal of the European 
Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(1), 3-42. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.01004.x 
Allegretto, S. A., A. Dube, and M. Reich (2011), Do minimum wages really reduce teen 
employment? Accounting for heterogeneity and selectivity in state panel data , Industrial 
Relations, 50 (2), 204–240. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-232X.2011.00634.x 
Allen, S., (1987),  Taxes, redistribution, and the minimum wage: a theoretical analysis , 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (3), 477–490. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1884214 
Alvaredo, F., A. Atkinson, T. Piketty and E. Saez (2013),  The Top 1 Percent in International 
and Historical Perspective , Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27, 3-20. DOI: 
10.1257/jep.27.3.3 
Antras, P. (2004),  Is the U.S. Aggregate Production Function Cobb-Douglas? New Estimates 
of the Elasticity of Substitution , Contributions to Macroeconomics, 4, article 4. 
Atkinson, A. B. (1970),  On the Measurement of Inequality , Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 
244-263. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(70)90039-6 
Bartels, L. M. (2008), Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age, 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press. 
Berndt, E. (1976),  Reconciling Alternative Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution , 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 58:1, pp. 59-68. 
Boadway, R., and K. Cuff, (2001),  A minimum wage can be welfare-improving and 
employment enhancing , European Economic Review 45, 553–576. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00066-0 
Brown, C., G. Curtis, and A. Kohen, (1982),  The Effect of the Minimum Wage on 
Employment and Unemployment , Journal of Economic Literature, 20, (2), 487-528.  
ECONOMIDES, MOUTOS     Worker Heterogeneity and Popularity of Minimum Wage 
 
37 
 
Card, D. and A. Krueger, (1994),  Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the 
Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania , American Economic Review, vol. 84, 
no. 4, pp. 772-793. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2118030 
Card, D. and A. Krueger, (1995), Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the 
Minimum Wage. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Card, D. and A. Krueger, (2000),  Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the 
Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply , American Economic Review, 
vol. 90, no. 5, pp. 1397-1420. DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.5.1362 
Chamley, C. (1986),  Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with 
Infinite Lives , Econometrica, 54, 607-622. 
Creedy, J. (1977),  Pareto and the distribution of income , Review of Income and Wealth, 23, 
pp. 405-411. 
Dickens, R., and A. Manning (2004),  Spikes and spill-overs: The impact of the national 
minimum wage on the wage distribution in a low-wage sector , Economic Journal, 
114(494), C95-C101. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-0133.2003.00198.x 
Dube, A., T. William Lester, and M. Reich, (2010),  Minimum Wage Effects Across State 
Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous Counties , Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 
92, no. 4, pp. 945-964. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40985804 
Economides, G., and T. Moutos, (2016),  Can Minimum Wages Raise Workers’ Incomes in 
the Long Run?  , Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 18 (6), 961-978. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12216 
Ferguson, T. (1995), Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic 
of Money-Driven Political Systems, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Gabaix, X. (2016),  Power Laws in Economics: An Introduction , Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 30, 1, 185-206. 
Gilens, M., and B. I. Page (2014),  Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest 
Groups, and Average Citizens , Perspectives on Politics, vol. 12, 564-581. 
Gintis, H., (2016),  Homo Ludens: Social rationality and political behavior , Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 126, 95-109. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.01.004 
Guesnerie, R., and K. Roberts, (1987),  Minimum wage legislation as a second best policy , 
European Economic Review 31, 490-498. https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(87)90067-5 
Hoff, K., and J. Stiglitz (2016),  Striving for balance in economics: Towards a theory of the 
social determination of behavior , Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 126, 
25-57. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.01.005 
Judd, K., (1985),  Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model , Journal of 
Public Economics, 28, 59-83. https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(85)90020-9 
Review of Economic Analysis 1 (2019) 1-38 
38 
 
Lee, D., and E. Saez, (2012),  Optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor markets , 
Journal of Public Economics, 96, 739-749. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.06.001 
Machin, S., and A. Manning, (1997),  Minimum wages and economic outcomes in Europe , 
European Economic Review, 41(3-5), 733-742. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-
2921(97)00032-9 
Manning, A., (1995),  How Do We Know That Wages are Too High? , The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 110(4), 1111-25. https://doi.org/10.2307/2946650 
Manning, A., (2003), Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Marceau, N., and R. Boadway, (1994),  Minimum wage legislation and unemployment 
insurance , Scandinavian Journal of Economics 96, 67-81.  
Mirrlees, J., (1971),  An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation , Review of 
Economic Studies, 38, 175–208. https://doi.org/10.2307/2296779 
Newmark, D., and W. Wascher, (2000),  Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of 
the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Comment. , American Economic 
Review, 90(5), 1362-1396. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2677855 
Newmark, D., and W. Wascher, (2008), Minimum Wages, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
Neumark, D., J. I. Salas, and W. Wascher, (2014),  Revisiting the minimum wage-
employment debate: Throwing out the baby with the bathwater , Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 67 (3), 608–648. https://doi.org/10.1177/00197939140670S307 
Phelps, E., (1997), Rewarding Work: How to Restore Participation and Self-Support to Free 
Enterprise, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Rebitzer, J., and L. Taylor, (1995),  The consequences of minimum wage laws: some new 
theoretical ideas , Journal of Public Economics 56, 245–255. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(93)01411-3 
Robinson, J., (1933), The Economics of Imperfect Competition. MacMillan, London. 
Saint- Paul, G., (2000), The Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions, Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
Schattschneider, E.E., (1935), Politics, Pressures and the Tariff, New York: Prentice-Hall. 
Sen, A. (1997), On Economic Inequality, Oxford University Press, 2nd edition. Oxford, UK. 
Sinn, H.-W., (2000),  The threat to the German welfare state , Atlantic Economic Journal, 
28(3), 279-294. 
Sobel, R., (1999),  Theory and Evidence on the Political Economy of the Minimum Wage , 
Journal of Political Economy, 107(4), 761-785.  
Stigler, G., J., (1970),  Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution , Journal of Law and 
Economics, 13, 1-10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/724835 
Webb, S., (1912),  The Economic Theory of a Legal Minimum Wage , Journal of Political 
Economy, 20, 973–98. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1820545 
